A court may deviate from an informal custody arrangement when best interests analysis (distance between the parties) or changes in circumstances (school starting) dictate.

February 14, 2019

Nebeker v. Orton, 2019 UT App 23 (Filed February 14, 2019).

In this case, a father was not involved in a child's from birth for a couple of years. But then fearing harm to the child because of the mother's drug addiction, the father visits the child and keeps him. Thereafter the mother decides to get clean, and the parents agree to a joint physical custody arrangement pending trial. At the time of trial, the parties live about 100 miles apart and the child was to start school in the near future. The court granted physical custody to the mother and minimum parent time with the father. The father appealed.

¶30 Father next argues that the district court erred by failing to identify a compelling reason to deviate from the informal custody arrangement—under which Child was thriving, happy, and well-adjusted—and awarding primary physical custody to Mother and parent-time to Father. 5 “The importance of the myriad of factors used in determining a child’s best interests ranges from the possibly relevant to the critically important. At the critically important end of the spectrum, when the child is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted, lies continuity of placement.” Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ¶ 26, 989 P.2d 491. “A very short custody arrangement of a few months, even if nurturing to some extent, is not entitled to as much weight as a similar arrangement of substantial duration. Of course, a lengthy custody arrangement in which a child has thrived ought rarely, if at all, to be disturbed, and then only if the circumstances are compelling.” Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 604 (Utah 1989) (cleaned up). In Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, (Utah 1988), a custody arrangement that had been in place for just over a year was held sufficient to establish continuity. Id. at 648.

¶31 In the present case, we note that the informal custody arrangement was temporary and had been in place for about ten months—from January 2016 until the district court’s decision in November 2016—falling between the lengths of duration established in our case law. But the length of the informal custody arrangement is not the dispositive factor here. Rather, the district court recognized that the agreement could not continue because Child would be starting school the following year. And Father admits that “when [Child] turns five and begins kindergarten, the Court really does have to pick one parent for [Child] to reside with, at least Monday through Friday.” Mother also acknowledges that where Child attends school is an issue that must be addressed. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion and supported its decision with adequate findings when it departed from the informal custody arrangement. An imminent change in circumstance, namely Child’s starting school, required a change in the custody arrangement. Father fails to address this significant undisputed fact.

¶32 The district court acknowledged that joint physical custody would be in Child’s best interests if the parties lived in the same community, but the parties’ distance from each other precluded such an arrangement. Prompted by this reality, the district court weighed the factors, see supra ¶¶ 9–11, and concluded that Child’s best interests were served by awarding Mother primary physical custody. It noted that (1) Mother had been the primary caregiver for the majority of Child’s life, (2) Mother was more likely to allow “frequent and continuing contact with the other parent,” and (3) Mother’s work schedule was more conducive to having primary physical care of Child. As this court noted in Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733, “if there is evidence supporting a finding, absent a legal problem—a ‘fatal flaw’—with that evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample record evidence that would have supported contrary findings.” Id. ¶ 20 n.5.

¶33 Thus, we conclude that the district court did not exceed its discretion in relying on evidence of changed circumstances in departing from the informal custody arrangement and awarding Mother primary physical custody of Child

Nebeker v. Orton, 2019 UT App 23 (Filed February 14, 2019).

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