osser v. Rosser Summary: A statutory contempt remedy simply does not fit the facts of this case, even if we assume that [Wife’s] version of the facts is correct. [Husband] did not commit deceit on the court, nor did he violate an order or judgment of the court. He appears to have violated the terms of the Mediation Agreement, and—although we express no opinion on the matter—he may have committed fraud or fraudulent nondisclosure upon [Wife] in the time period between the mediation and the entry of the Decree.

Rosser v. Rosser, 2019 UT App 5 (Filed January 10, 2019)

12 Statutory Basis for Contempt and Inherent Contempt Powers:  Under a mediation agreement the parties would pay the taxes due equally of about $29,000. However, then after Wife had paid her half of the taxes and before Husband had paid his half, the parties filed an amended return that show a refund of approximately $7,000. The parties then changed the final decree so that Wife would get the refunds and pay any further tax liability. However, the amended tax return was erroneous and the parties actually still owed $,7000. Wife felt deceived, Husband refused to pay the tax, and Wife sued.  Court found Husband had deceived Wife, and help him in contempt and ordered him to pay the remaining taxes and attorney fees.  Husband appealed the contempt portion.  The Court of Appeals reserved the contempt because there were no findings to support the contempt on the statutory grounds for contempt. The court stated, “¶10 Under Utah statutory law, a court has authority to hold a person in contempt of court for any one of twelve enumerated reasons. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301 (LexisNexis 2012).[The text of this code section is reprinted below in full.) (The court also directed attention to its footnote 3, but stated that Wife did not invoke the inherent contempt powers in her arguments.) [Husband] contends that none of the twelve grounds apply here, and that therefore the district court was without statutory authority to hold him in contempt. We agree with [Husband] [that there was no evidence of violation of one of the 12 enumerated basis.] . . . [Court’s Footnote 3. Under Utah law, courts also have inherent (non-statutory) contempt powers. See Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 36, 123 P.3d 416 (“A court’s authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both statutory and inherent.”). In this case, however, [Wife] did not ask the district court to invoke its inherent powers and, in its order, the district court did not expressly invoke any such powers. On appeal, [Wife] defends the district court’s order by asserting that the court had the statutory power to issue its contempt order. Because the district court does not appear to have invoked its inherent power, and because [Wife] does not argue that it did, we do not address whether the district court would have had the power to hold [Husband] in contempt of court pursuant to its inherent (as opposed to its statutory) authority.] . . . CONCLUSION ¶21 A statutory contempt remedy simply does not fit the facts of this case, even if we assume that [Wife’s] version of the facts is correct. [Husband] did not commit deceit on the court, nor did he violate an order or judgment of the court. He appears to have violated the terms of the Mediation Agreement, and—although we express no opinion on the matter—he may have committed fraud or fraudulent nondisclosure upon [Wife] in the time period between the mediation and the entry of the Decree. But [Wife’s] remedy, if any, for [Husband’s] actions must be found somewhere other than the contempt statute. We vacate…contempt…and attorney fees…” Posser v. Rosser, 2019 UT App 5 (Filed January 10, 2019).

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